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1. Introduction 
The broad outline of Hume’s account of our capacity to draw moral 
distinctions is fairly clear: reason alone cannot draw these distinctions, 
rather we must resort to feelings or sentiments of a particular kind to 
distinguish between virtue and vice. That much can be inferred from the 
very titles of the first two sections of book 3 of Hume’s Treatise of Human 
Nature.1 There is no doubt that Hume is, in some sense, a moral 
sentimentalist. Hume’s description of the psychological process by means of 
which we come to approve or condemn an action is also reasonably clear: 
we take the action as the external sign of a character trait;2 that lead us to 
consider the idea of this trait and whether it produces pleasure or pain on 
people close to an agent endowed with it; we then sympathize with this 
pleasure or pain, experiencing an equivalent (if weaker) sympathetic 
   
1 In what follows Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature is cited with notations of the form T 
b.p.s.p / SBN pqr, the lower-case letters here standing for arabic numerals. Numerals 
immediately following T indicate book, part, section, and paragraph numbers in David 
Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2007); numerals following ‘SBN’ indicate page number in David Hume, 
A Treatise of Human Nature, 2nd ed., ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1978). An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals is cited with 
a notation of the form 2E s.p.p. Numerals immediately following 2E indicate section, part 
(when the case) and paragraph numbers in David Hume, An Enquiry concerning the 
Principles of Morals, ed. J. B. Schneewind (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 1983). EMPL 
followed by a number indicates a page in David Hume, Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, 
ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1987). 
2 "If any action be either virtuous or vicious, ’tis only as a sign of some quality or character." 
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feeling,3 which, on its turn, leads to one of four indirect passions (love or 
hatred, pride or humility) – these passions are the moral feelings, the 
perceptions of approval and disapproval, which guide our moral 
judgments.4 Hume’s view about the nature of moral convictions or opinions 
is much harder to pin point. He has been interpreted as a noncognitivist, 
according to whom to hold a particular moral opinion is to have certain 
feelings or passions;5 as a dispositional cognitivist, according to whom to 
believe that an action or character trait is virtuous or vicious is to believe 
that it is such as to cause feelings of approval or disapproval in a spectator 
that satisfies certain conditions;6 as a naturalist cognitivist, according to 
whom moral beliefs mobilize ideas copied from the impressions of 
approval and disapproval but ascribe a dispositional quality to the action 
or person evaluated;7 and, finally, as a projectivist according to whom we 
come to think of actions or character traits as virtuous or vicious because 
we project our moral feelings onto these objects of evaluation. According to 
this view, moral convictions incorporate an error: we think of actions and 
character traits themselves as virtuous or vicious, but they are not, in 
themselves, virtuous or vicious. It, therefore, represents Hume as an error 
theorist.8 My goal in this paper is to defend a projectivist reading of Hume’s 
account of moral convictions. 
This interpretation faces some challenges. First, its emphasis on error 
seems to fit poorly with Hume’s friendly attitude towards moral 
distinctions. Right at the beginning of the of the Enquiry Concerning the 
   
3 That the pain or pleasure which arises from the contemplation of a character trait is 
produced by sympathy is the main thesis of T 3.3. Exactly how these feelings are connected 
to moral appraisal is a harder to ascertain. According to Hume, in order to arrive at a stable 
judgment and correct distortions in our sympathetic feelings we have to adopt a general 
point of view (T 3.3.1.15 / SBN 581-2). How to characterize this point of view and how it 
corrects for distortions in sympathy is a matter of controversy. For an illuminating 
discussion of these issues see Sayre-McCord (1994) and Cohon (2008, ch.5). 
4 "The pain or pleasure, which arises from the general survey or view of any action or 
quality of the mind, constitutes its vice or virtue, and gives rise to our approbation or 
blame, which is nothing but a fainter and more imperceptible love or hatred." (T 3.3.5.1 / 
SBN 614). 
5 This view is defended by Flew (1963), Blackburn (1984, ch. 6) and Smith (2009). 
6 This view is defended by Lo (2009, p. 60-66). Mackie (1980, p.66-69) considers but 
ultimately rejects this view. 
7 This view is defended by Cohon (2008, p.111-3). 
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Principles of Moral, for instance, Hume claims that those “who have denied 
the reality of moral distinctions, may be ranked among the disingenuous 
disputants” and recommends that an “antagonist of this kind” be left alone 
for eventually “mere weariness” will bring him to the “side of common 
sense and reason” (2E 1.2). It may seem that an error theorist would be 
exactly this kind of “antagonist”. Second, the passages that provide the 
strongest textual evidence for a projectivist reading seem to have such 
unpalatable consequences that interpretative charity recommends one to 
seek an alternative interpretation. Hume first introduces the idea of 
projection in his discussion in the Treatise of the origins of the idea of the 
necessity involved in causal relations. He claims that this idea is derived 
from the impression of the mind’s propensity to move from the impression 
of an object to an idea of its usual attendant and that, therefore, the necessity 
of a causal relation is something that “exists in the mind, not in objects” (T 
1.3.14.22 / SBN 165). To explain how we come to thing as objects themselves 
as connected by causal relations, Hume claims that “the mind has a great 
propensity to spread itself on external objects, and to conjoin with them any 
internal impressions, which they occasion, and which always make their 
appearance at the same time that these objects discover themselves to the 
senses” (T 1.3.14.25 / SBN 167). The same propensity is supposed to explain 
how we come to think of objects as having a particular smell, for instance. 
The claim that virtue and vice “may be compared to sounds, colours, heat 
and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in 
objects, but perceptions in the mind” (T 3.1.1.26 / SBN 469, my emphasis) 
strongly suggests, therefore, that moral thought should receive the same 
projectivist treatment dispensed to our thought about causality. However, 
it seems hard to take seriously the claim that virtue and vice are perceptions 
in the mind. As Stroud has pointed out “if vice were a perception or feeling 
in the mind, then in saying that I get a certain feeling from contemplating X 
I would be saying that I get vice from contemplating X. And that is 
incoherent" (STROUD, 2003, p.181).9 
In light of these challenges, the other interpretations of Hume’s view 
about the nature of moral convictions mentioned above may seem more 
attractive for, one could argue, they can satisfactorily account for his 
sentimentalism while avoiding the problems faced by a projectivist reading. 
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But this is a mistake: in the next two sections I argue that the noncognitivist 
and the dispositional reading fail to account for a number of claims Hume 
puts forward in stating his moral sentimentalism. The shortcomings of 
these views will reveal that the best way in which to conceive of a moral 
judgment in light of Hume’s text is as a belief that mobilizes an idea that is 
a copy of a moral feeling. In section 4 I argue that once we understand moral 
judgments in this way and once we have clearly in view the nature and 
origin of the idea these judgments mobilize we can see that moral 
judgments, as Hume conceives of them, involve a peculiar kind of category 
error: they involve predicating of an action or character trait an idea that 
cannot be so predicated because it is not the idea of a property or quality. 
The idea that we project our moral feelings onto the world is introduced, I 
will argue, as an attempt at explaining why we systematically incur in this 
category mistake.  
If this interpretation is correct, then it sets Hume apart from other error 
theorists. Error theories concerning moral judgment usually consist in the 
conjunction of two independent theses: (a) that moral judgments ascribe a 
particular quality to the action, person or character trait they evaluate and 
(b) that as a matter of fact the quality in question does not exist. This is the 
form Mackie’s error theory takes (see MACKIE, 1991, ch. 1) and this is how 
he reads Hume (see MACKIE, 1980, p.71-2). Kail reads Hume in the same 
way: moral judgments ascribe essential value (i.e., non-instrumental value) 
to their objects but we have independent reason to believe that there is no 
such thing as essential value (KAIL, 2007, p.169). On the reading I am 
proposing, Hume’s view does not take this form. It does not depend on a 
negative metaphysical thesis to the effect that virtue and vice are not actual 
features of reality. Instead, it rests solely upon considerations about the 
nature of the ideas that are mobilized in moral judgments and moral 
thought in general. It claims not that moral judgments make metaphysical 
assumptions about reality that turn out to be false but rather that our moral 
ideas are not at all ideas of qualities that could be truthfully predicated of 
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2. The noncognitivist reading 
Hume has often been read as a noncognitivist about moral convictions 
because it has seemed to many that he was arguing for noncognitivism at T 
3.1.1. In this section, after claiming that “those judgments, by which we 
distinguish moral good and evil” are perceptions (T 3.1.1.2 / SBN 456) he 
puts forward the Argument from Motivation: “Since morals, therefore, have 
an influence on the actions and affections, it follows, that they cannot be 
deriv’d from reason; and that because reason alone, as we have already 
prov’d, can never have any such influence” (T 3.1.1.6 / SBN 457). It may 
seem plausible to reconstruct this argument thus: 
(i) The perceptions in which moral convictions consist can, by 
themselves, influence actions; 
(ii) Beliefs cannot, by themselves, influence actions; 
(iii) Therefore, the perceptions in which moral convictions consist are 
not mere beliefs. 
A belief, Hume takes himself to have already established, is a vivid idea 
(T 1.3.5.7 / SBN 86 and T 1.3.10.3 / SBN 119-120). If vivid, strong ideas 
cannot influence our actions, neither can weaker ideas. Given that there are 
only two types of perceptions (ideas and impressions), the perceptions in 
which moral convictions consist must then be impressions of some sort or, 
at the very least, a compound of ideas and impressions. And given that, 
according to Hume, the only impressions that are capable of moving us to 
action are direct passions, it follows that to hold a moral opinion is to have 
a certain direct passion or some mental state capable of producing, on its 
own, a direct passion (perhaps accompanied by some idea or belief). 
Therefore, if this is a correct reconstruction of Hume’s argument, he is 
committed to a noncognitivist view of moral convictions.10 
   
10 Contemporary noncognitivism is usually formulated as a thesis about the linguistic 
function of moral statements or about the nature of the speech act of making a moral claim. 
Noncognitivists usually hold that moral claims express attitudes or prescribe rules instead 
of describing the world. It is implausible to read Hume as putting forward a view of this 
kind. Clearly, the question with which he is concerned is about the nature and origins of a 
particular kind of mental state – a particular perception. It is still plausible, nevertheless, 
to describe him as a psychological noncognitivist if he does defend the view that to hold a 
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That, however, is not a plausible reconstruction of the Argument from 
Motivation for premise (ii) is not a plausible reconstruction of the claim that 
reason alone has no influence on actions. This thesis is supposed to have 
been established in T 2.3.3. In this section Hume argues for the notorious 
view that reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions. His is 
argument is the following: “The understanding exerts itself after two 
different ways, as it judges from demonstration or probability”; “the first 
species of reasoning alone is ever the cause of any action” (T 2.3.3.2 / SBN 
423-4); the second species of reasoning alone can only direct impulses that 
are produced by prospects of pain or pleasure; therefore, “reason alone can 
never produce any action, or give rise to volition”; it could only prevent 
action “by giving an impulse in a contrary direction to our passion”, but if 
it could do that, then it would be able to produce actions as well (T 2.3.3.4 
/ SBN 414-5); therefore, one cannot be deterred from some actions nor 
impelled to others by reason alone. Let us refer to the conclusion of this 
argument as the thesis of the Inertia of Reason. This argument has frequently 
been interpreted as an argument for the Inertia of Belief, i.e., the view that 
beliefs cannot produce the kind of motivational impulse that could deter or 
impel one to action. And that interpretation is indeed natural: reasoning 
alone produces beliefs; that being the case, if beliefs alone could produce 
motivational impulses, it would seem to follow that reason alone has an 
influence in our actions. No wonder this argument has frequently been 
reconstructed thus: 
(I) Reasoning is either demonstrative or probable; 
(II) The beliefs that are produced by demonstrative reasoning do not 
produce, by themselves, motivational impulses; 
   
to have a belief. Furthermore, if we take the argument above as an argument for a 
conclusion about the linguistic function of moral statements it is invalid. We can admit (iii) 
that when we hold a moral opinion we are in a mental state that involves more than a mere 
belief and consistently hold that moral statements describe the world, instead of expressing 
the speaker’s attitudes or prescribing rules. That one has certain beliefs may be entailed by 
the fact that one has successfully made a promise without it being the case that in saying 
“I promise to...” one is thereby expressing those beliefs or asserting their content (that is 
not the linguistic function of this phrase). In the same way, that one has certain attitudes 
may be entailed by the fact that one holds a particular moral view without it being the case 
that when one states one’s view using moral terms one expresses these attitudes (see 
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(III) The beliefs that are produced by probable reasoning do not 
produce, by themselves, motivational impulses; 
(IV) Therefore, beliefs produced by reasoning do not produce, by 
themselves, motivational impulses.11 
The first thing to notice about this argument is that its conclusion is not 
the same as premise (ii) above. Premise (ii) is the claim that beliefs in general 
cannot influence action or, which is the same from Hume’s perspective, 
cannot produce motivational impulses. Conclusion (IV) is restricted to 
beliefs that are the outcome of reasoning. We could move form (IV) to (ii) 
only by assuming that all beliefs are produced by reasoning. That, however, 
is a false supposition and one Hume is not willing to make. A belief 
according to Hume is vivid idea and impressions can produce vivid ideas 
without any contribution from reason. Impressions, Hume tell us, carry 
conviction with them (T 1.3.5.7 / SBN 86). When I see a red book on the 
table in front of me I come to believe that there is a red book in the table 
simply because impressions are such as to give rise to vivid copies of 
themselves. There are, therefore, beliefs that are not the product of 
reasoning but rather the product of impressions, and these beliefs are 
beyond the scope of the argument for the Inertia of Reason. 
If we substitute (IV) for (ii) in the Argument from Motivation, we end up 
with an invalid argument: 
(i) The perceptions in which moral convictions consist can, by 
themselves, influence actions; 
(IV) Beliefs derived from reason cannot, by themselves, influence actions; 
(iii) Therefore, the perceptions in which moral convictions consist are 
not mere beliefs. 
Clearly, the conclusion that could be drawn from (i) and (IV) is not (iii) 
but rather “the perceptions in which moral convictions consist are not mere 
beliefs derived from reason” (an anti-rationalist thesis rather than a 
noncognitivist one). The possibility that moral judgments or convictions 
consist in beliefs that are derived from impressions rather than some form 
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of reasoning remains open, given that for all we know these beliefs could 
influence our actions.12 
One could insist that even though Hume is not arguing for the 
unqualified version of the Inertia of Belief thesis (according to which no belief 
can produce motivational impulses) in T 2.3.3, he is committed to this thesis 
and appeals to it in the Argument from Motivation. That is implausible from 
an exegetic point of view, for Hume formulated the second premise of that 
argument as the claim that reason has no influence on actions and clearly 
refers the reader to the “proof” provided at T 2.3.3. But, worse still, there is 
textual evidence that Hume rejected not only the unqualified version of the 
Inertia of Belief thesis but also the weaker claim (IV), which restricts the thesis 
to beliefs derived from reason. 
In presenting the argument for the Inertia of Reason Hume claims that 
“’Tis obvious, that when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any 
object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity” (T 2.3.3.3 / 
SBN 414). A prospect of pain or pleasure, however, is a causal belief about 
the pain or pleasure that I would experience were certain circumstances to 
obtain. Hume seems to be claiming then that this particular kind of causal 
belief is capable of producing a motivational impulse. And this 
interpretation is reinforced by the claims Hume puts forward in the section 
entitled “Of the Influence of Belief”. In this section Hume claims that 
impressions of pleasure and pain (call these hedonic impressions) influence 
the will (T 1.3.10.2 / SBN 118) and that the ideas derived from these 
impressions have a similar effect when they become vivid enough, i.e., 
when they become beliefs (T 1.3.10.3 / SBN 119). That happens, because 
impressions and ideas differ only in strength and vivacity: when an idea 
becomes vivid enough, therefore, its effects become similar to the effects of 
the corresponding impressions. Belief causes “an idea to imitate the effects 
of the impressions” (T 1.3.10.3 / SBN 119). Presumably, the beliefs that 
mobilize the ideas derived from hedonic impressions are beliefs concerning 
the pleasure and pain that is produced by particular objects, i.e., prospects 
   
12 Formulating the Argument from Motivation as an inference to the best explanation, as 
Smith (2009, p.105) does, makes no difference here. If beliefs that are not produced by 
reasoning can influence our behavior, then the hypothesis that moral convictions are 
beliefs that are directly derived from impressions and the hypothesis that moral 
convictions are impressions of some kind provide equally good explanations of the fact 
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of pleasure and pain. These beliefs, therefore, have an influence on the 
passions that mimics the influence of impressions of pleasure and pain. 
Given Hume’s commitment to the idea that to influence the will is to 
produce an impulse towards a particular action (T 2.3.3.4 / SBN 415), we 
should understand the influence of hedonic impressions in this way: they 
produce motivational impulses in the form of passions of propensity or 
aversion. Prospects of pain and pleasure should, then, have the same effect. 
These prospects are causal beliefs, produced by causal reasoning. It follows 
that Hume is committed to the view that some beliefs produced by causal 
reasoning do produce, by themselves, motivational impulses – a claim that 
directly contradicts the thesis of the Inertia of Belief, even in its qualified 
version. 
The only way to avoid this conclusion is to deny that hedonic 
impressions produce emotions of propensity and aversion by themselves, 
i.e., to hold that they can only produce these motivational states by 
interacting with a preexisting desire. The only desire that could play this 
role would be a general desire to experience pleasure and to avoid pain. 
There are two ways in which to explain how the interaction between a 
hedonic impression and this desire could work, but neither can account for 
the claim that prospects of pain and pleasurable mimic the motivational 
effects of hedonic impressions. (A) A natural way in which to conceive of 
this interaction is this: suppose I eat a slice of pineapple; that produces a 
pleasurable sensation; I then come to think of pineapples as pleasurable and 
this new belief interact with the standing general desire for pleasure to 
produce a derived desire for pineapples. But if that is the case, it is not the 
pleasurable impression that is producing the new desire, but rather the 
interaction between the previous existing desire for pleasure and the belief 
that pineapples are a source of pleasure, i.e., a prospect of pleasure. And 
that cannot be right: prospects of pain and pleasure mimic the motivational 
effects of hedonic impressions; therefore, the capacity of these impressions 
to produce those effects cannot depend on prospects of pain and pleasure. 
(B) It must be simply a matter of fact that the interaction between the 
pleasurable impression and the general desire for pleasure directly 
produces a derived desire or aversion for the source of the impression. But 
if this is how hedonic impressions produce motivational impulses then 
prospects of pain and pleasure do not mimic the motivational effects of 
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Hume has a story to tell about how causal beliefs interact with preexisting 
emotions of propensity or aversion: these beliefs extend the propensity or 
aversion for a particular object O to others objects that are known to bring 
about O (T 2.3.3.3 / SBN 414). Prospects of pain or pleasure would interact 
with a preexisting general desire to experience pleasure and avoid pain in 
exactly this way. But it is not only prospects of pain and pleasure that can 
interact with motivational impulses to produce this kind of effect – all 
causal beliefs can do so. And most causal beliefs are totally unrelated to 
impressions of pleasure and pain – their capacity to produce derived desires 
by interacting with preexisting desires is not a reflection of a power that 
belongs to hedonic impressions but is rather an original power of the 
human mind. Therefore, if prospects of pain and pleasure produced new 
desires in this way, they do not mimic the effects of hedonic impressions 
but simply behave as ordinary causal beliefs. 
We do better, then, to take at face value Hume’s claim that hedonic 
impressions influence the will: they do so by themselves. Prospects of pain 
and pleasure, a kind of causal belief produced by causal reasoning, mimic 
the effects of these impressions, therefore influencing, by themselves, the will 
and our actions. I conclude that Hume is not committed to the Inertia of Belief 
thesis, not even if it is restricted to beliefs derived from reason.13 We should, 
then, reject the noncognitivist reconstruction of the Argument from 
Motivation. That argument is best understood as an argument for a 
conclusion about the psychological origins of moral convictions (these 
perceptions are not the product of reasoning) rather than an argument for 
   
13 This entails that (I)-(IV) if not a correct reconstruction of the argument for the Inertia of 
Reason. How to properly reconstruct this argument is not the topic of this paper. I just want 
to call attention the fact that reason why the argument was reconstructed as an argument 
for the Inertia of Belief was the supposition that “if reason alone produces a belief and this 
belief alone produces a motivational impulse, then reason alone is capable of producing 
motivational impulses”. The only way to reconcile the claim that prospects of pleasure and 
pain (which are causal beliefs produced by reasoning) produce, by themselves, 
motivational impulses with the thesis of the Inertia of Reason is to deny this assumption. 
Cohon makes a compelling case for the view that this assumption can be reasonably denied 
if we take reason to consist in a process (or several processes). We can then understand the 
argument for the Inertia of Reason as an argument for the claim that the processes in which 
reason consist produce only beliefs, not motivational impulses, even though some of these 
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a conclusion about the psychological nature of moral convictions (that these 
perceptions are not beliefs).14 
That is enough to remove the main reason to adopt a noncognitivist 
reading of Hume’s moral sentimentalism. But one could hold that even 
though he is not arguing for this view in T 3.1.1 that is, nevertheless, his 
view. Indeed, that is suggested by the way in which he formulates his view 
at the beginning of T 3.1.2: 
… the course of the argument leads us to conclude, that since vice and virtue 
are not discoverable merely by reason, or the comparison of ideas, it must be 
by means of some impression or sentiment they occasion, that we are able to 
mark the difference betwixt them. Our decisions concerning moral rectitude 
and depravity are evidently perceptions; and as all perceptions are either 
impressions or ideas, the exclusion of the one is a convincing argument for 
the other. (T 3.1.2.1 / SBN 470) 
This passage strongly suggest that moral convictions are impressions 
rather than beliefs for it is natural to take “decisions concerning moral 
rectitude and depravity” to be moral convictions. And this suggestion is 
reinforced by the subsequent claims that the impressions in questions are 
pleasurable or painful feelings we get from contemplating a character and 
that, in the case of virtue, these pleasurable feeling itself “constitutes our 
praise or admiration” (T 3.1.2.3 / SBN 471). That suggestion, however, is 
misleading. Hume himself, in the same section of the Treatise, acknowledges 
   
14 This raises the question of how exactly to understand the Argument from Motivation. I 
have suggested, in the previous note, that the best way to reconstruct the claim that reason 
has no influence on the will is as the claim that the processes in which reason consist do 
not yield motivational impulses but only beliefs. To correctly reconstruct the argument we 
should build around this premise. One possible reconstruction is this: (i) moral convictions 
can, by themselves, influence the will; (ii*) reasoning processes cannot, by themselves, 
influence the will; (iii*) therefore, moral convictions are not the product of reasoning 
processes. However, this argument has the same form as (a) hedonic beliefs can, by 
themselves, influence the will; (b) reasoning processes cannot, by themselves, influence the 
will, (c) therefore, hedonic beliefs are not the product of reasoning processes. Given that 
Hume accepts (a) and (b) and denies (c), he has to declare arguments with this form invalid. 
Here again, I find Cohon’s suggestion to be illuminating. She reconstruct the argument 
thus: (A) the processes of moral discrimination can, by itself, influence the will; (B) 
reasoning processes cannot, by themselves, influence the will; (C) therefore, the process of 
moral discrimination is not a reasoning process (COHON, 2008, p.82). This is a valid 
argument and it fits well with Hume’s formulation of his conclusion: “’tis in vain to 
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the possibility that one can hold a moral conviction without having an 
impression of the kind that constitutes our praise or condemnation: 
Nor is every sentiment of pleasure or pain, which arises from characters and 
actions, of that peculiar kind, which makes us praise or condemn. The good 
qualities of an enemy are hurtful to us; but may still command our esteem 
and respect. ’Tis only when a character is consider’d in general, without 
reference to our particular interest, that it causes such a feeling or sentiment, 
as denominates it morally good or evil. ’Tis true, those sentiments, from 
interest and morals, are apt to be confounded, and naturally run into one 
another. It seldom happens, that we do not think an enemy vicious, and can 
distinguish betwixt his opposition to our interest and real villainy or 
baseness. But this hinders not, but that the sentiments are, in themselves, 
distinct; and a man of temper and judgment may preserve himself from these 
illusions. (T 3.1.2.4 / SBN 472) 
Only sentiments of pleasure and pain derived from the disinterested 
contemplation of a character can constitute or lead to the perceptions of 
praise and condemnation. We are, however, likely to mistake interested 
sentiments for moral sentiments and that can lead us, for instance, to “think 
[a virtuous] enemy vicious”. Clearly, to think an enemy vicious is to hold a 
moral conviction. Given that in this case the agent does not have a genuine 
moral sentiment, the moral conviction cannot be identified with one such 
sentiment. Nor can it be identified with the interested sentiment which the 
agent mistakes for a moral sentiment, for “a man of temper and judgment” 
could have the interested sentiment in question and lack the moral 
conviction that his enemy is vicious. No other impression is a plausible 
candidate to play the role of moral conviction in this example. Therefore, 
given that “as all perceptions are either impressions or ideas, the exclusion 
of the one is a convincing argument for the other”, it follows that the moral 
conviction in this case is a vivid idea, i.e., a belief. This is a strong 
counterexample to the noncognitivist interpretation of Hume’s 
sentimentalism. 
Nevertheless, Hume clearly identifies the perceptions of praise and 
blame, approval and disapproval, with impressions of a particular kind. A 
feeling of satisfaction of a particular kind “constitutes our praise or 
admiration”. Latter we are told that “our approbation or blame [...] is 
nothing but a fainter and more imperceptible love or hatred." (T 3.3.5.1 / 
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of reflection (T 2.2.1.1 / SBN 329). We should, therefore, distinguish the 
feelings of moral approval and disapproval, which are impressions, from 
moral convictions, which, at least in some cases, are ideas. In particular, the 
claim that our “decisions concerning moral rectitude and depravity” are 
impressions should be read in light of this distinction: these “decisions” are 
not moral convictions but rather the moral feelings of approval or 
disapproval by means of which distinguish virtue and vice. 
3. Disposicionalism 
With the distinction between moral feelings and moral convictions in 
view, we can ask what the content of these convictions is. A number of 
passages suggest that Hume takes moral convictions to be causal beliefs. 
Consider these examples: 
…when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean 
nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or 
sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it. (T 3.1.1.26 / SBN 469) 
The hypothesis which we embrace is plain. It maintains, that morality is 
determined by sentiment. It defines virtue to be whatever mental action or 
quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice the 
contrary. (2E Appendix I.10) 
Both passages suggest that to claim or to believe that an action or 
character trait is virtuous is to claim or to believe that the action or character 
trait is such as to produce a moral feeling of approval in a suitable spectator. 
And it is not hard to find in Hume’s text indications of how to characterize 
this suitable spectator. First, Hume holds that as a matter of fact moral 
feelings arise only from the disinterested contemplation of a character trait 
and are grounded on a sympathetic response to the feelings of the people 
affected by the character trait in question. Second, the relevant moral 
feelings are those experienced not from the particular point of view each of 
us occupies but from a “steady and general point of view” which corrects 
for distortions in our sympathetic responses (T 3.3.1.14-5 / SBN 580-2). It is 
not at first view implausible, then, to read Hume as claiming that to believe 





HUME AS AN ERROR THEORIST  
 
 97 
ANALYTICA, Rio de Janeiro, vol 22 nº 2, 2018, p. 84-113 
http://dx.doi.org/10.35920/arf.2018.v22n2.84-113 
that it would cause a moral feeling of approval or disapproval in any 
sympathetic and disinterested spectator that occupies the general point of 
view, or, which is the same, that any such spectator is disposed to 
experience the appropriate moral feeling upon contemplating the action or 
character trait in question.15 
I will refer to this interpretation as the “dispositional reading” of 
Hume’s account of moral convictions.  According to this reading, Hume is 
a cognitivist regarding moral convictions: he takes these convictions to 
represent moral facts. Furthermore, he is a naturalist cognitivist, for moral 
facts turn out to be ordinary natural facts, namely, facts about the 
psychological dispositions of human beings to experience moral feelings 
under certain (very specific) hypothetical conditions. Moral convictions, 
then, turn out to be causal beliefs about the psychological effects of the 
contemplation of character traits.  
Despite its appeal, this reading faces some very serious exegetic 
problems. First, it is reason that “discovers the connection of causes and 
effects” (T 3.1.1.12 / SBN 459). Causal beliefs are the product of probable 
reasoning. But Hume takes pains to argue for the view that moral 
convictions are not the product of reasoning. The dispositional reading, 
therefore, fits poorly with the arguments of T 3.1.1. Second, if moral 
convictions were causal beliefs, we would have to infer a character to be 
virtuous after observing that it regularly produces feelings of approbation 
in suitably positioned spectators, for all causal beliefs are grounded in the 
observation of a constant conjunction between the objects we take to be 
connected by a causal relation (T 1.3.6.4 / 88). But we “do not infer a 
character to be virtuous, because it pleases: But in feeling that it pleases after 
such a particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous. The case is the 
same in our judgments concerning all kinds of [...] sensations” (T 3.1.2.3 / 
SBN 471). Third, the claim that we do not infer a character to be virtuous 
but rather feel it to be virtuous suggests (once the noncognitivist reading is 
off the table) not only that we form moral convictions without inference but 
that moral convictions are directly produced by moral feeling. For if our 
“decisions concerning moral rectitude and depravity” are feelings of some 
sort (T 3.1.2.1-2 / SBN 470) and these are not the starting point of an 
inference to a moral conclusion, how else could they lead us to “pronounce 
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an action blame-able or praise-worthy” (T 3.1.1.3 / SBN 456)? That 
suggestion is strengthened by the claim, at the end of the passage just 
quoted, that the same is true of moral judgments and judgments concerning 
sensations. As observed above, for Hume there are at least two ways in 
which to arrive at a belief: we can do so by reasoning or an impression can 
directly produce a belief. Beliefs concerning the color of objects, for instance, 
are usually arrived at in the latter way: to see, say, a red tomato is to have a 
visual impression; in normal circumstances, this impression is copied, 
giving rise to a vivid idea of a red tomato; if that idea is strong enough, then 
it will be a belief. This is a process of belief formation that involves no 
inference at all. What Hume seems to be claiming in the passage just quoted, 
then, is that moral convictions are arrived at in a similar way: just as I come 
to believe that a particular object is red by seeing its color, I come to believe 
that a character trait is virtuous by feeling its virtue, i.e., by experiencing a 
feeling of approval upon contemplating it.16 Now, beliefs that are the direct 
product of impressions are simply vivid copies of these impressions. This 
entails that the entirety of their content is derived from those impressions. 
So, for instance, if I come to believe that “this tomato is red” upon seeing 
the tomato, the belief in question is nothing but a vivid copy of the 
impression I had when I saw the tomato and the ideas it mobilizes are ones 
that could be derived from the impression itself. In particular, the idea of 
redness that constitutes this belief is a simple idea – a copy of the simple 
impression of redness. To the extent that the belief that the tomato is red is 
directly produced by the visual impression, therefore, its content cannot be 
properly represented as “this tomato is such as to cause an impression of 
redness in a human observer under such and such lighting conditions”. A 
belief with this content would be much more than a copy of the visual 
impression I have when I look at the tomato, for it mobilizes ideas that 
cannot be derived from that impression. In particular, the idea of cause is 
not a copy of any sensible impression. In a similar way, to the extent that 
moral convictions are directly produced by moral feelings, their content is 
not adequately represented by the dispositional reading. 
The dispositional reading may be on to something nevertheless. Rachel 
Cohon has offered an interpretation of Hume’s account of moral 
convictions that does justice to the passages that motivate the dispositional 
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reading while at the same time avoiding the objections I just presented. 
According to Cohon, moral ideas (i.e., the ideas of virtue and vice) are 
copies of the moral feelings of approval and disapproval. Like any other 
idea, moral ideas can “attain great forcefulness and liveliness, which 
renders them beliefs” (COHON, 2008, p.105). The main error of the 
noncognitivist reading, Cohon argues, is to construe Hume as recognizing 
only one type of moral perceptions, namely, moral feelings, and ignoring 
the possibility that these feelings can be copied and give rise to ideas. The 
dispositional reading, while recognizing moral ideas, errs in taking the 
beliefs that mobilize those ideas to be causal beliefs and, thus, in ascribing 
causal content to moral ideas (COHON, 2008, p.106). But what, then, are 
moral beliefs about? The crux of Cohon’s interpretation is the claim that 
while moral ideas are copies of moral feelings, the moral convictions or 
opinions that are constituted by those ideas represent “a person, trait, or 
action as having a moral property”, namely, the property we feel when we 
have a moral feeling (COHON, 2008, p.105). What property is that? Hume 
is clear in stating that virtue and viciousness are not properties of the objects 
taken in themselves: 
Take any action allow’d to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine 
it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, 
which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain 
passions, motives, volitions, and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in 
the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. 
You never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and 
find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action.” 
(T 3.1.1.16 / SBN 468-9). 
Take any action allow’d to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine 
it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, 
which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain 
passions, motives, volitions, and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in 
the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. 
You never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and 
find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. 
(T 3.1.1.16 / SBN 468-9).” 
If we can depend upon any principle, which we learn from philosophy, this, 
I think, may be considered as certain and undoubted, that there is nothing, 
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but that these attributes arise from the particular constitution and fabric of 
human sentiment and affection. (EMPL 162, my emphasis) 
The claim that there is no vice to be found in the object can be 
understood in two ways: one may take it to mean that there are no moral 
properties (and then, if one holds that moral convictions represent actions 
or character traits as having moral properties one will be lead to an error 
theory) or it may mean that the objects of moral evaluation have no moral 
properties when considered in themselves, i.e., when considered 
abstraction made of their relation to us and, particularly, to our feelings. 
Cohon defends the latter reading. An action or character trait in itself has no 
moral properties because these are relational properties and one term of the 
relation is a human psychological reaction (COHON, 2008, p.115). Moral 
properties are response-dependent – to have a moral property is actually to 
figure in a relation with our subjective responses. Indeed, they may very 
well be dispositional properties, like “the tendency a trait has to cause 
disapproval [or approval] in the well-informed and imaginative human 
observer” (COHON. 2008, p.112). That does not mean, however, that to 
have a moral conviction is to have a belief whose content is properly 
captured by the dispositional reading. When we think of an action or 
character trait as virtuous or vicious we mobilize a simple moral idea rather 
than the complex idea of a tendency to cause certain feelings. Nevertheless, 
it may be that, unbeknownst to us, the properties we feel when we have 
moral feelings of approval or disapproval are dispositional properties. In 
exactly the same way, in thinking the tomato before me to be red, I am not 
thinking that the surface properties of the tomato are such as to cause a 
sensation of redness in human observers under such and such lighting 
conditions, even if as a matter of fact that is what it is for something to be 
red (COHON, 2008, p.111). 
In sum, according to Cohon, although moral convictions are usually 
directly produced by moral feelings (as beliefs about the colors of objects 
are directly produced by visual impressions) and although the ideas 
mobilized in these convictions are simple moral ideas (copies of moral 
feelings), to ascribe viciousness to an action or character is to ascribe “that 
property, whatever it is, that I sense when I disapprove” (COHON, 2008, 
p.112). Given that the property we feel when we experience moral feelings 





HUME AS AN ERROR THEORIST  
 
 101 
ANALYTICA, Rio de Janeiro, vol 22 nº 2, 2018, p. 84-113 
http://dx.doi.org/10.35920/arf.2018.v22n2.84-113 
terms, it follows that moral claims have naturalistic truth-conditions (which 
as a matter of fact are sometimes satisfied – see COHON, 2008, p.99-100), 
even if these cannot be read off moral ideas.17 
Cohon’s interpretation has the virtue of providing a unified of account 
of both the skeptical-sounding and the realist-sounding passages in Hume’s 
text, while holding on to the claim, central to Hume’s sentimentalism, that 
moral convictions are directly guided by our moral feelings. I will now 
argue, however, that the centerpiece of Cohon’s interpretation – the claim 
that, even though moral ideas are simple ideas derived from moral feelings, 
moral beliefs represent their object of evaluation as having a particular 
property and are sometimes true – is unattainable from the perspective of 
Hume’s theory of ideas. 
For Hume, all that is ever present to the mind are its perceptions (T 
3.1.1.2 / SBN 456). To think of something (for instance, to think of a unicorn) 
is to have a perception of a particular kind, namely, an idea. To believe is 
likewise to have a perception, namely, a vivid idea. Ideas are the stuff of 
which beliefs and thoughts are made. The quality, the content and the 
effects of a belief are all inherited from the ideas that constituted it. What 
the discussion of the problems faced by the dispositional reading shown is 
that the ideas of virtue and vice that constitute moral convictions are simple 
ideas, copies of feelings of disinterested approval or disapproval (which are 
phenomenologically distinct from other similar feelings – T 3.1.2.4 / SBN 
471-2). And Cohon’s reading incorporated this conclusion. But if moral 
ideas of virtue and vice are copies of feelings of approval and disapproval, 
then these are the only ideas that can constitute thoughts and beliefs about 
those feelings. That is because these feelings are indirect passions and 
passions are simple impressions (T 2.1.2.1 / SBN 277) – meaning that we 
cannot form an idea of them by putting together ideas copied from other 
impressions. In the same way, the idea that is a copy of the impression of 
redness is the only idea that can constitute thoughts about the color red. 
Now, there is no doubt that we do think about (in contrast with 
experiencing) the feeling of disinterested approval we have when 
   
17 Cohon’s reading is clearly committed to an externalist view of the reference of moral 
terms, such as ‘virtue’ and ‘vice’. The reference of these terms is not fixed by the content of 
our moral ideas, considered in themselves. Rather, moral terms refer to that property, 
whatever it may be, that causes moral impressions and, consequently, produces in us 
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contemplating certain traits of character. We may think of this feeling, for 
instance, in order to compare it to feelings of love that arrive from the 
contemplation of the good someone made us and determine what they have 
in common and in what they differ. To have one such thought, to think of 
this feeling, is simply to have the idea of virtue before one’s mind. So much 
so that one who has never experienced this kind of feeling will be unable to 
entertain a thought about it (particularly, this person will be unable to 
conceive of its peculiar phenomenological feel), just as a blind person 
cannot conceive of the colors she never saw (T 1.1.1.9 / SBN 5). This means 
that the moral ideas of virtue and vice are not ideas of properties, but ideas 
of a particular kind of mental state, a particular kind of feeling. Given that 
the content of a thought is determined by the ideas that constitute it, and 
that to think of the feeling of approval is merely to entertain the simple idea 
of virtue, it follows that we cannot even conceive of moral properties. We 
cannot, for instance, conceive of the property of being virtuous (as 
something that belongs to a character trait) in order to compare it to the 
property of being, say, socially encouraged. For when we bring to mind the 
idea of virtue, the thought in question will be constituted by exactly the 
same idea as the thought concerning the feeling of disinterested approval, 
and so will be the very thought. That is, we will be thinking about a feeling, 
not a property of character traits. 
So, the ideas of virtue and vice are ideas of certain feelings. Given that 
assumption, how could the belief that a particular character trait is virtuous 
or vicious represent that trait as having a particular property (as Cohon 
would have it)? That would only be possible if the contribution the ideas of 
virtue and vice make to the content of the thought they constitute changes 
as the context changes. Compare these two beliefs: (a) that Nero’s cruelty 
produces in us an unpleasant feeling of disapproval and (b) that Nero’s 
cruelty is vicious. The first belief (which is not a moral belief) is constituted 
by the idea of Nero’s cruelty, the idea of vice (since this is the idea we 
mobilize in thinking about the feeling of disapproval) and the idea of the 
particular relation in which they stand, namely, a causal relation. It does not 
represent Nero’s cruelty as having a particular property, but rather 
represents it as the cause of a particular feeling. If we lose the idea of the 
causal relation, we get belief (b). If Cohon is correct, this belief represents 
Nero’s cruelty as having a particular property. Given that the idea of Nero’s 
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would have to claim that the subtraction of the idea of causal relation 
changed the representational content of the idea of vice. It stood for a feeling 
in (a), now it stands for a property. It is very implausible, however, to 
ascribe this view to Hume. He consistently holds that simple ideas (such as 
the moral ideas of virtue and vice) represent that of which they are a copy18 
and never hints at the possibility that the same simple idea could itself 
represent different things when combined with different sets of ideas. 
Furthermore, even if we admitted that when incorporated to moral 
beliefs moral ideas represent a property, (a) and (b) cannot be 
simultaneously true given Hume’s understanding of truth. Contradiction 
to truth, Hume tell us, consist in the “disagreement of ideas, consider’d as 
copies, with those objects, which they represent” (T 2.3.3.5 / SBN 415). 
Presumably, truth consists in the agreement of ideas, considered as copies, 
with the objects they represent. Claim (a) is true. That means that the simple 
ideas that constitute this belief agree with that which they represent, when 
considered as copies of those things. In particular, the idea of vice in this 
case represents the feeling of disapproval and is an accurate copy of this 
feeling. But then (b) cannot be true, even if we admit that it represents 
Nero’s cruelty as having a particular property. For if that is so, the idea of 
vice in this case represents a property. In order to assess the truth of this 
belief we would have to consider whether the idea of vice agrees with the 
property it represents, i.e., whether it is an accurate copy of it. But it cannot 
be, for, given that (a) is true, that idea is an accurate copy of a feeling and, 
therefore, cannot be an accurate copy of a property (a thing of a completely 
different ontological kind). Therefore, belief (b) as Cohon would construct it 
cannot be true. 
Cohon, then, is right in claiming that moral ideas are copies of moral 
feelings of approval and disapproval. But that view is incompatible, at least 
in the framework of Hume’s philosophy, with the view that moral beliefs 
represent actions, person or character traits as having a particular property 
and that some moral claims are true. These conclusions pave the way to the 
interpretation that presents Hume as an error theorist. 
   
18 "Ideas always represent the objects or impressions, from which they are deriv’d, and can 
never without a fiction represent or be apply’d to any other." (T 1.2.3.11 / SBN 37). 
Consider also "[...] all ideas are deriv’d from impressions, and are nothing but copies and 
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4. Projectivism 
In the last section I argued that, according to Hume, moral ideas of 
virtue and vice are copies of moral feelings of approval and disapproval 
and that, consequently, these ideas are ideas of feelings and not ideas of 
properties. I also argued that this entails that if moral claims like “Nero’s 
cruelty is vicious” ascribe a property to the character trait they evaluate, 
then they cannot be true. But this is a problematic conclusion: if a moral 
claim ascribes a property and we have no reason to suppose that the 
property in question is never instantiated by character traits, then it should 
be possible for one such claim to be true. This reveals that, given the 
commitments of Hume’s sentimentalism and his account of truth, there is 
some incoherence involved in taking moral beliefs to represent their object 
of evaluation as having a particular property. The best way in which to 
make sense of this, I will now suggest, is to read Hume as a projectivist and, 
therefore, as an error theorist of a peculiar kind. 
The view that the ideas of virtue and vice are ideas of certain feelings 
rather than ideas of properties allow us to make sense of Hume’s baffling 
claim that virtue and vice “may be compared to sounds, colours, heat and 
cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, 
but perceptions in the mind” (T 3.1.1.26 / SBN 469, my emphasis). We can 
now understand this as the claim that the ideas of virtue and vice are ideas 
of certain feelings and that when we mobilize these ideas in thought we 
think about these feelings (these perceptions) and not about any quality or 
property that could be ascribed to objects or, more properly, to character 
traits. As noted above, this view has what seem to be some very unpalatable 
consequences: if the idea of vice is the idea of a feeling of disapproval, to 
think that I get a feeling of disapproval from contemplating a trait of 
character is to think that I get vice from contemplating that trait. And that, 
Stroud holds, is an incoherent thought (STROUD, 2003, p.181). But Hume 
does not take that to be an incoherent thought: the idea of vice is the idea of 
a feeling of disapproval and, therefore, it is perfectly intelligible to think 
that I get vice from contemplating a certain character trait. Not only that, but 
this is the kind of thought in which the idea of vice is properly employed. 
This also allows us to understand why Hume saw no contradiction between 
the claim that virtue and vice are perceptions and the mind and the 
immediately preceding claim that “when you pronounce any action or 
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your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the 
contemplation of it” (T 3.1.1.26 / SBN 469). In this passage he is not 
defending a view about what kind of property virtue and vice are (for he 
immediately goes on to say that they are not qualities in objects) nor is he 
defending a dispositionalist conception of the content of moral statements, 
rather he is indicating the kind of thought in which the ideas of an action or 
character trait and moral ideas of vice or virtue are properly conjoined – 
namely, thoughts about the capacity of actions or traits of character to 
produce the kind of feeling moral ideas stand for.19 
But if virtue and vice are indeed perceptions in the mind rather than 
properties it follows that when we think of a character trait or action as 
vicious, as we certainly do, we are predicating a feeling of a character trait 
or action. And that is a nonsensical thought: feelings are the kind of thing 
we can have, not the kind of thing that can be instantiated by a character 
trait or an action. Predicating virtue or vice of a character trait or action 
involves, therefore, a category error – particularly, the error of taking the 
idea of a mental state that can be ascribed to thinking beings as the idea of 
a property or quality that could be predicated of something. Surely this 
leads to the view that moral claims and beliefs systematically incorporate 
an error, but Hume would not flinch before this consequence, for he holds 
a very similar view regarding our causal beliefs. 
According to Hume, we have no idea of the kind of necessity involved 
in a causal relation as something that belongs to objects themselves. The 
only idea we have of this necessity is the idea of a mental thing: the 
“determination of the thought to pass from causes to effects and from effects 
to causes” (T 1.3.14.22 / SBN 166). On that account, this necessity “is 
something, that exists in the mind, not in objects” (T 1.3.14.22 / SBN 165). 
The idea of this necessity, therefore, is the idea that we have at our disposal 
to think about this peculiar determination of the mind (as when, for 
instance, we entertain the thought that this determination is produced by 
   
19 The same explanation does not apply to another passage that is usually evoked in favor 
of the dispositional reading: “The hypothesis which we embrace is plain. It maintains that 
morality is determined by sentiment. It defines virtue to be whatever mental action or 
quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice the contrary.” 
(2E Appendix I.10). This passage can be made compatible with the reading I am proposing 
if we suppose that in it Hume is not presenting a claim about the meaning of moral terms 
but rather a view about what is the feature that is shared by all those character traits that 
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the experience of a constant conjunction between the cause and the effect). 
This idea does not represent anything “that does or can belong to the 
objects” (T 1.3.14.19 / SBN 164, my emphasis). Nevertheless, we “suppose 
necessity and power to lie in the objects we consider, not in our mind” (T 
1.3.14.25 / SBN 167). That is, we ascribe the idea that is a copy of a particular 
determination of the mind to objects themselves – and we commit this 
mistake systematically. The situation is exactly the same as with moral 
ideas. 
The proneness to this mistake requires an explanation, and that is why 
Hume introduces the idea of projection. We make this mistake 
systematically because the mind has “a great propensity to spread itself on 
external objects, and to conjoin with them any internal impressions, which 
they occasion, and which always make their appearance at the same time 
that these objects discover themselves to the senses” (T 1.3.14.25 / SBN 167). 
The explanation seems to be that because certain internal impressions 
always accompany the impression of the object, the ideas derived from 
these impressions become associated. This would usually lead to a causal 
belief (to the effect that the object produces the feeling) but because we fail 
to distinguish the internal impression from the perception of the object we 
simply ascribe the idea of the internal impression to the object as one of its 
properties: “The agreeable quality is thought to lie in the object, not in the 
sentiment; and that merely because the sentiment is not so turbulent and 
violent as to distinguish itself, in an evident manner, from the perception of 
the object” (EMPL 165).20 
In the case of moral ideas, because the contemplation of a character trait 
is usually accompanied by a moral feeling of approval or disapproval, we 
end up ascribing the idea of this feeling as properties to the character trait 
(and consequently to persons who instantiate this trait and to actions that 
follow from it). A projectivist explanation concerning moral beliefs is 
offered in this notorious passage from the Enquiry Concerning the Principles 
of Morals:  
   
20 Hume does not offer a detailed account of this psychological process. The way in which 
he introduces it (“‘Tis a common observation, that the mind has a great propensity to 
spread itself on external objects” - T 1.3.14.15 / SBN 167) suggest that he takes this 
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Thus the distinct boundaries and offices of reason and of taste are easily 
ascertained. The former conveys the knowledge of truth and falsehood: The 
latter gives the sentiment of beauty and deformity, vice and virtue. The one 
discovers objects, as they really stand in nature, without addition or 
diminution: The other has a productive faculty, and gilding or staining all 
natural objects with the colours, borrowed from internal sentiment, raises, in 
a manner, a new creation. (2E Appendix I.21).21 
We can now understand talk of “gilding or staining all natural objects 
with the colours, borrowed from internal sentiment” as the claim that moral 
beliefs involve predicating of objects like actions and character traits an idea 
that is actually a copy of a sentiment. They involve, in this manner, a 
projective error. Stroud argues against this view. According to him, we “do 
not think that an act of willful murder itself has a feeling of disgust or 
disapprobation, any more than we think that a painting on a wall has a 
sentiment of pleasure or awe. That is nonsense in each case.” (Stroud, 1993, 
p.261). My point is that this is exactly Hume’s view. His investigation of the 
nature and origin of moral ideas reveal them to be ideas of certain feelings 
and that renders moral judgments nonsense. The task of an investigator of 
human nature is then to explain why we systematically make this mistake 
and how it eluded us for so long. The notion of the propensity of the mind 
to spread itself on objects is an attempt at providing one such explanation.22 
   
21 This passage, by itself, does not provide very strong evidence for the projectivist reading. 
Cohon’s reading can accommodate it. Cohon holds that Hume’s point in this passage is 
that virtue and vice are relational properties that are produced by interaction between the 
contemplated character trait and the spectator’s mind – in this sense it is a new creation 
(Cohon 2008, p. 122-3). Obviously, however, the projectivist reading can take this passage, 
as well as the anti-realist passages considered in the previous section, at face value, i.e., as 
claiming that there are no moral properties. 
22 One may, of course, wonder whether Hume is successful in offering this explanation. 
Stroud (1993) thinks he is not. But the reason why Stroud finds Hume’s projective 
explanation unsatisfactory is that it does not explain how we can intelligibly think about 
the virtuousness or viciousness of actions or character traits (1993, p.267-8). That, I am 
suggesting, is not something Hume sets out to explain. He actually holds that we cannot 
think intelligibly about such things – moral thoughts involve a category error that render 
them nonsensical. Stroud does suggest that this may be Hume’s view (1993, p.262-3) and, 
as far as I can see, provides no exegetic reason to reject this interpretation. It may be that, 
on account of the theory of ideas which Hume assumes, the same considerations that lead 
to the thesis that moral beliefs are nonsensical attributions of feelings to actions or character 
traits would lead to the conclusion that not even attributions of ordinary empirical 
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One might object that this leads us right back to the noncognitivist 
reading. For the beliefs that result from the projective error are nonsensical 
and traditional noncognitivism held precisely that because moral 
statements are nonsensical they have no truth-value and, therefore, express 
an attitude or emotion instead of describing reality.23 But it would be a 
mistake to adopt a noncognitivist reading of Hume’s sentimentalism for 
this reason. Hume’s topic is not the linguistic function of moral statements 
or terms. Rather, when he raises questions about moral judgments he is 
concerned with the psychological nature of a particular kind of perception 
(T 3.1.1.2-3 / SBN 456). The question he is concerned with in T 3.1.1 is not 
whether moral statements describe the world or merely express an attitude, 
but whether our “decisions concerning moral rectitude and depravity” are 
ideas or impressions, and he argues for the latter (T 3.1.2.1 / SBN 470). The 
only noncognitivist thesis that can be plausibly ascribed to Hume, therefore, 
is the claim that moral convictions themselves are not beliefs but rather 
feelings or sentiments of some sort. I have argued in section 2 that while 
Hume clearly holds that the decisions about morality are impressions 
(namely, moral feelings), he takes moral convictions to be beliefs – vivid 
ideas produced by moral feelings. The fact that the beliefs in question are 
nonsensical (that they consist in the predication of a feeling to an action, 
person or character trait) does not affect this claim. One may insist that the 
beliefs in question cannot be strictly speaking false (although Hume himself 
does not hint at this possibility), but that does not change the fact that they 
are beliefs (vivid ideas rather than impressions), that they are never true 
and that they systematically incorporate an error, a misunderstanding of 
the idea the mobilize. 
The projectivist reading of Hume’s sentimentalism, therefore, fits 
remarkably well with the text. The claims at the beginning of the Enquiry 
Concerning the Principles of Morals seem to provide a recalcitrant passage, 
however. There Hume claims that those “who have denied the reality of 
moral distinctions, may be ranked among the disingenuous disputants” 
who are to be brought to the “side of common sense and reason” (2E 1.2). 
   
if that is the case we would have a reductio ad absurdum of Hume’s argument for the 
projective view. If that is a real difficulty, it is not one of which Hume was aware. The fact 
that Hume’s projective view is vulnerable to this difficulty does not change the fact that he 
held this view. 
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And it seems that to claim that no moral belief is true is the same as to deny 
the reality of moral distinctions. In order to accommodate this remark 
within the projectivist reading we have to hold that the skeptic Hume is 
denying to engage with in this passage is not the one who denies the truth 
of moral beliefs but rather one that refuses to draw moral distinctions. 
Hume identifies the perception “by which we distinguish moral good and 
evil” with moral impressions, i.e., feelings of disinterested approval or 
disapproval (T 3.1.1.2 / SBN 456). These feelings, I have argued, directly 
produce moral beliefs. Obliviously, these feelings are not under our control. 
It is a fact that the contemplation of certain character traits produces 
approbation and the contemplation of others produces disapprobation. 
Moral beliefs, as beliefs in general, are, therefore, "more properly an act of 
the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures" (T 1.4.1.8 / SBN 183). 
We simply find ourselves drawing moral distinctions, approving and 
disapproving of certain actions and character traits and having certain 
moral beliefs. The skeptic Hume is urging us to ignore in the passage 
quoted above is the one who claims not to make moral distinctions, who 
claims that when faced with the noblest virtue and the most despicable vice 
he does not come to believe that the first is commendable and the other vile. 
That, Hume is claiming, is mere pretend and we need not bother with it. 
5. Conclusion 
I have argued that the noncognitivist reading of Hume’s moral 
sentimentalism, according to which to have a moral conviction is to have a 
particular passion instead of a belief, fails because Hume himself 
acknowledges the possibility of holding a moral conviction without having 
an impression of the kind that constitutes our praise or condemnation. That 
is the case of the agent that declares a virtuous enemy vicious while 
experiencing no feeling of moral disapproval. Given that for Hume 
perceptions are either impressions or ideas, the fact that in this case there is 
no impression with which the moral conviction could be identified entails 
that it is actually an idea, more particularly, a belief. 
The dispositionalist reading incorporates the conclusion that moral 
convictions are beliefs but conceives of them as causal beliefs about the 
power of certain character traits to produce moral feelings in suitable 
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for Hume’s claim that we feel rather than infer virtue and vice. The best way 
in which to understand this claim is as the claim that moral convictions are 
directly produced by certain impressions, namely, moral feelings, and, 
therefore, that moral ideas of virtue and vice are copies of those feelings 
(rather than complex ideas of the power of certain character traits to 
produce moral feelings).  
Rachel Cohon’s cognitivist interpretation of Hume’s sentimentalism 
aimed at making (a) the view that moral ideas are copies of feelings 
compatible with the claims that (b) moral beliefs ascribe certain properties 
to the actions or character traits they evaluate and (c) that, at least on 
occasion, they are true. I have argued, however, that these claims are 
actually incompatible. According to (a) the ideas of virtue and vice are ideas 
of feelings and then, even if we were willing to admit that the contribution 
these ideas make to the content of the thoughts they constitute is different 
in different context, so that according to (b) they could stand for moral 
properties instead of feelings when incorporated into a moral belief, these 
belief would all be false for the moral ideas, being ideas of feelings, would 
not be faithful copies of the properties they stood for. 
The shortcomings of these readings reveal that Hume takes moral ideas 
of virtue and vice to be ideas of feelings of approval and disapproval and 
that moral beliefs (which conjoin these ideas with ideas of actions or 
character traits) involve a kind of category error – we take the idea of a 
feeling to be the idea of a property. The idea of the projection of feelings 
onto the world is introduced as an attempted explanation of why and how 
we systematically make this mistake. 
This projectivist reading fits rather well with Hume’s text. If it is correct, 
then Hume is an error theorist, according to whom moral convictions are 
beliefs but can never be true. At the same time, however, it sets Hume apart 
from other error theorist. Error theories, such as Mackie’s (1991, ch. 1), 
usually consist in the conjunction of two independent theses: (a) that moral 
judgments ascribe a particular quality to the action, person or character trait 
they evaluate and (b) that as a matter of fact the quality in question does not 
exist. Clearly that is not Hume’s approach. He does not provide an account 
of our ideas of moral properties and then argues that properties thus 
conceived do not exist and, therefore, that moral beliefs incorporate false 
assumptions about reality. His point is rather that once we understand the 
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properties but of feelings and that, therefore, these ideas, as the idea of the 
necessity involved in causal relations, “represent not any thing, that does 
or can belong to the objects" (T 1.3.14.19 / SBN 164, my emphasis). Moral 
beliefs are not only false as a matter of fact – they involve a category error 
that renders them incapable of being true. Hume’s moral error theory, 
therefore, does not rest upon a metaphysical claim about the furniture of 
reality. It rests solely upon considerations about the origin and nature of 
our moral ideas – the proper object of Hume’s science of human nature. 
References 
AYER, A. 1946. Language, Truth, and Logic. Dover Publications. 
BLACKBURN, S. 1984. Spreading the Word. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
COHON, R. 2008. Hume’s Morality. New York: Oxford University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199268443.001.0001  
FLEW, A. 1963. On the Interpretation of Hume. Philosophy, 38: 178–181. 
HUME, D. 1978. A Treatise of Human Nature. Ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge e P.H. 
Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
HUME, D. 1983. An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals. Ed. J. B. 
Schneewind. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing. 
HUME, D.  1985. Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. Ed. E. F. Miller. 
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. 
HUME, D.  2007. A Treatise of Human Nature. David Fate Norton and Mary J. 
Norton (eds). Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
JOYCE, R. 2009. Expressivism, Motivation Internalism, and Hume. In Pigden, C. 
(ed). Hume on Motivation and Virtue. 30-56. Nova York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230281158_2  
KAIL, P. J. E. 2007. Projection and Realism in Hume’s Philosophy. Nova York: 
Oxford University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199229505.001.0001  
LO, N. Is Hume Inconsistent? – Motivation and Morals. In C. Pigden, (ed). Hume 
on Motivation and Virtue. 57-79. Nova York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230281158_3  
MACKIE, J. L. 1980. Hume’s Moral Theory. Londres: Routledge. 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203359891  








112 ANALYTICA, Rio de Janeiro, vol 22 nº 2, 2018, p. 84-113 http://dx.doi.org/10.35920/arf.2018.v22n2.84-113 
RAFAEL GRAEBIN VOGELMANN 
PIGDEN, C. 2009. If Not Non- Cognitivism, Then What? In: C. Pigden (ed). Hume 
on Motivation and Virtue. 80-104. Nova York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230281158_4  
SANDIS, C. 2009. Hume and the Debate on ‘Motivating Reasons’. In: Pigden, C. 
(ed). Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Nova York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230281158_7  
SAYRE-MCCORD, G. 1994. On Why Hume’s “General Point of View” Isn’t Ideal 
– and Shouldn’t Be. Social Philosophy and Policy 11(1): 202–228. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500004350  
SMITH, M. 2009. The Motivation Argument for Non-Cognitivism. In: C. Pigden, 
(ed). Hume on Motivation and Virtue. 105-120. Nova York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230281158_5  
STROUD, B. 1993 “Gliding” or “staining” the world with “sentiments” and 
“phantasms”. Hume Studies 19:  253–72. 




Neste artigo considero e rejeito uma leitura não-cognitivista do sentimentalismo moral de 
Hume (segundo a qual ele identifica convicções morais com impressões de um tipo 
particular) bem como uma leitura disposicionalista (segundo a qual Hume concebe 
convicções morais como crenças causais a respeito do poder de traços de caráter de produzir 
certos sentimentos em espectadores apropriados). Sustento que as falhas dessas leituras 
mostram que Hume é mais bem compreendido como um teórico do erro, de acordo com 
quem embora convicções morais sejam crenças elas jamais são verdadeiras. Em contraste 
com teorias do erro contemporâneas, contudo, a tese de Hume não se baseia em uma 
alegação metafísica para efeito de que não há propriedades morais. Antes, ele sustenta que 
ideias morais não são ideias de qualidades que possam ser corretamente predicadas de ações 
ou traços de caráter, mas ideias de sentimentos e que, portanto, crenças morais incorporam 
sistematicamente um erro categorial. 
Palavras-chave: Hume, Sentimentalismo Moral, Convicções Morais, Projetivismo, 




In this paper I consider and reject a noncognitivist reading of Hume’s moral 
sentimentalism (according to which he identifies moral convictions with impressions of 
particular kind) as well as a dispositional reading (according to which Hume takes moral 
convictions to be causal beliefs about the power of character traits to produce certain 
feelings in suitable spectators). I argue that the shortcomings of these views show that 
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convictions are beliefs they are never true. In contrast with contemporary error theories, 
however, Hume’s view is not grounded on a metaphysical claim to the effect that there are 
no moral properties. He holds instead that moral ideas are not at all ideas of qualities that 
could be truthfully predicated of actions or character traits but rather ideas of feelings and, 
therefore, that moral beliefs systematically incorporate a category error. 
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